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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DON GERALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,
JAMES ALLEN SCOTT, by and through his
Guardian Ad Litem, Erma Lee Scott,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,
JEANETTE WALTON, Administratrix of
the Estate of Robert W a ton, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,

Case

No.
11753

BOYD SIMMONS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,

ANGELO MELO, WAULSTINE McNEELY
and WILLIAM J. ROEDEL,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant.

Petition of Plaintiffs-RespondPnts for RPhearing
and Bri0f in Support Thereof

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs sePk judgment rPquiring tlw State InsuranC(' Fund to hear its sharp proportionately as its in-
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terest appears, of attorneys'
. feL•s and cm;ts incurred bv•'
plaintiffs in recovering from third parties, 8Ums paid
to or for plaintiff8 by the Fund for medieal and ho8pital
expenses and for compensation for injurie:-; occasioned
by on-the-job accidents caused by such third partie's.

DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT
Plaintiffs received Summary Judgment by Memorandum Decision based upon agreed facts. Defendants
appealed.

DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
The Supreme Court reversed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION
FOR REHEARING
Plaintiffs-respondents seek rehearing and affinnation of the District Court judgment and a detennination
that costs as well as attorney fees are reimbursable.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Supreme Court Decision states the facts.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiffs-rt'spondents petition the Court for a rehearing for the following reasons:
POINT I
A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED SO THAT
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS WILLIAMS, SCOTT, MELO,
McNEELEY, AND ROEDEL CAN MAKE THEIR ORAL ARGUMENT.
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POINT II
THIS COURT HAS ALLOWED RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN WORTHEN AND DENIED RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR. THIS DECISION, IF Alr
LOWED TO STAND, WOULD RESULT IN UNJUST AND
UNNECESSARY DISCRIMINATION AND WOULD ALSO
RESULT IN DENIAL TO PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR STATUTORY RIGHT TO HAVE THE COMPENSATION CARRIER
PAY ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS.
POINT III
THE COURT HAS JUDICIALLY ALTERED THE ENACTMENT DATE OF SECTION 35-1-62 TO THE PREJUDICE
OF PLAINTIFFS.
POINT IV
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR, HAS DENIED PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
CONTRARY TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
POINT V
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR HAS DENIED PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO "UNIFORM OPERATION" OF
LAWS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
POINT VI
THE INSTANT DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF.
POINT VII
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF, 19 UTAH 2d 80 SHOULD
BE APPLIED CON SITE NT WITH ITS OWN FACTS.
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ARGUMEKT
POINT I
A REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED SO THAT
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS WILLIAMS, SCOTT, MELO,
McNEELEY, AND ROEDEL CAN MAKE THEIR ORAL ARGUMENT.

Counsel of record for the above nanwd Plaintiffs
are Gayle D<->an Hunt and Dwight L. King. rrl1rough
apparent clerical error, tl1ey were never notified of the
date of oral argument. It is possible the notice meant
for them was placed in an envelope addressed to Richard
Leedy, attorney for Defendant and Appellant, because
a check with Mr. Leedy reveals that he has an indistinct
memory of receiving two notices.
Because of the importance of the issues here involved and because counsel for the above named Plaintiffs feel very deeply that tlrny should be allowed to fully
argue tht> issues raised by this petition and by llieir
original hril'f,
respectfully request this Honorable
Court to grant a rehearing.
POINT II
THIS COURT HAS ALLOWED RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN WORTHEN AND DENIED RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR. THIS DECISION, IF ALLOWED TO STAND, WOULD RESULT IN UNJUST AND
UNNECESSARY DISCRIMINATION AND WOULD ALSO
RESULT IN DENIAL TO PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR STATUTORY RIGHT TO HAVE THE COMPENSATION CARRIER
PAY ITS FAIR SHARE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS.

The Utah State Legislature enacted Utah Code Annotated 35-1-G2 into law in the year 1945. The construction placed on that statute presumably followed the
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riresent \Vorthen construction nntil Octolwr 24, 1962 when
this Court decided the McConnell case. On April 3, 1967
this Court in vV orthen held the McConnPll interpretation
was incorrect. Now this Court reaffirms the \Vorthen
interpretation but denies recoHry to tlw plaintiffs. Why
does this Court allow recoyery in \V orthen and deny
recovery
We submit that the plaintiffs are entitled to a definitive answer consistent with the simple
dictates of justice.
This Court, b>r allowing recovery in "\Vorthen and
denying it here has adopted the "first man to the courtroom" test in determining whether to apply retroactive
or prospective effect to a later interpretation of a statute.
In Utah it is no longer a question of who has a just cause
that determines the result. The question would now
seem to be who is more effective at the art of being first
to get his case on a court calendar. For example:
(1) A and B are injured on the same day in industrial accidents. They file their cases on the
same day. The clerk places A's case on the
trial calendar first. A recovers. B comes to
court, through no fault of his own. on the following day. B cannot recover because of this
court's present holding as to retroactivity.
(2) A is injured in an industrial accident before B.
A files his case before B. In the clerk's shuffling
of cases B's case goes to trial first. Under the
present ruling B recovers and A doesn't.

6
r:rhe race to thP courtroom shouldn't determine who
receivPs the bent>fits of this statute. The statute itself
should determine who benefits
it. Let U8 bear in mind
that this Court has now twice decided that Rec. 35-1-G2
was meant by the legislature to allow recovery to lWrsons
situated in the po8ition of plaintiffs. Assume \Vorthen
didn't exist.
have seven plaintiffs presently hefort>
thP Court. Suppose Scott had reached the courtroom
first, should the other six fail? How ah out 1\'Ielo? How
about RoedPl f Yet such is thP position in which the
Court and con8equently the trial bench and bar find
themselvPs in view of the decision in this case. If justice
demandPd a departure from logic, that would be one
thing. But lwre justice demands a return to logic. The
legislature intended from the date it pas8ed Section 35-162 into law that compensation carriers bear their share
of attorney's fees and cost8 in third
cases. This
8tatute as
interpreted unquestionably coincides
with justice. It can hardly be arguPd a8 an abstract
concept of fairness that comppm;ation carriers should
he allO"wed free rides. The McConnell decision was based
on a highly technical language interpretation and by
allowing the compensation carrier a free ride and requiring someone else to pay for that ride caused and
brought about a long line of unju8t results. \Vhy, then,
should not this injustice be limited
giving retroactive
effect to this Conrt's pre8ent interpretation of the statute? \Vhy should \Vorthen rt>cover and these plaintiffs
he denied recon•ry? If there had been no \Vorthen case,
one of thesP plaintiffs would have recovered. We be-
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lieve this Honorable Court should grant a rehearing
so that these matters can be fully argued.
POINT III
THE COURT HAS JUDICIALLY ALTERED THE ENACTMENT DATE OF SECTION 35-1-62 TO THE PREJUDICE
OF PLAINTIFFS.

As heretofore pointed out, Section 35-1-62 was enacted into law in the year 1945. This Court has held
in Worthen and also in the cases at Bar that said statute
requires compensation carriers to pay their share of
attorney's fees and costs in third party cases. In view
of this interpretation, we must conclude that the legislative intent has continued to be the same from 1945 to
the present and that that intent is to not allow any free
rides on the part of compensation carriers in third party
cases. During the period of time behveen McConnell and
Vv orthen this Court is presumed to have followed McConnell. This was because of a technical interpretation,
not because the result was fair because quite obviously
it wasn't. Now, that interpretation has been modified
so that it coincides with justice. But this Court, by
denying retroactive effect to its decision, has modified
the effective date of Section 35-1-62, which was determined by the legislature to be 19±5 and has said that
behveen October 24, 1962 and April 3, 1967, except for
one case, the Worthen case, this statute will be inapplicable. This Court has said in refusing to give retroactive
effect to the Worthen decision that to do so "would
amount to judicial legislation."
agree that our appel-
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late courts should not judicially legislate. Our position
is that to slice a piece of time out of the period during
which a statute Pxists on the books as a valid law and
by judicial fiat to say that that statute will not be
enforced and n•cognized as the law of the land during
said piece of time, constitutes judicial legislation and
violates fundamental conc<c•pts of separation of powt>rs
in a democratic form of govenment.
POINT IV
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR, HAS DENIED PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
CONTRARY TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution insofar as material here reads as follmvs:
"No State shall make or enforce any law ...
nor deny to any person 'lvithin its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
\Vhile it is true that t>qual protection of laws does
not rPqnire absolute equality of treatnwnt in all situations, it does protect citizt>ns against unequal treatment
hy resort to pm·ply arbitrary and nebulous classifications
or differences. This has been t>xplained in several United
States Supreme Court cases.

In liValter" vs. City of St. Louis (Mo. 1954) 347 U.S.
231, 74 S.Ct. 505, 98 L.Ed. 660, the Court stated:
"Equal protection doPs not require identity
of treatment. It only requires that classification
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rest on real and not feigned differences, that the
distinction have somP relevancP to the purpose for
which the classification is made, and that the
different treatments be not so disparate, relative
to the difference in classification as to be wholly
arbitrary. Cf. Dominion Hotel Inc. v. State df
Arizona, 249 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct. 172, 81 L.Ed 1193;
New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New
York, 303 U.S. 573, 58 S.Ct. 721, 82 L.Ed. 1024;
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex. rel. "Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 110, 86 L.Ed. 1655. 'In its
discretion it may tax all, or it may tax one or
some, taking care to accord to all in the same class
equality of rights.' SouthwPstern Oil Co. v. State
of Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 121, 30 S.Ct. 496, 54 L.Ed.
688."
The Supreme Court of the United States has also
made it very clear that the equal protection clause is
directed to every form of state action, whether legislative, executive or judicial.
See Yick Wo v. H opkius (1886) 118 L.S. 356, 373374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, where the Court stated:

"* * * Though the law itself be fair on its face,

and impartial in appearancP,
if it is applied
and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand, so
practically
to make unjust and illPgal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the constitution."
In Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 334 F.S. 1, 68 S.Ct.
836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, the Court emphasized that State Court
actions come within the equal protection of laws provi-
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sion of the United States Constitution. There the Court
stated:
''rl'he short of the matter is that from the time
of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
until the present, it has been the consistent ruling
of this Court that the action of the States to which
the Amendment has reference, includes action of
state courts and state judicial officials. Although,
in construing the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, differences have from time to time been
expressed as to whether particular typt'S of state
action may be said to offend the Amendment's
prohibitor>' provisions, it has never been suggested that state court action is irrnnunized from
the ope.ration of those provisions simply because
the act is that of the judicial branch of the state
government.''
\Ye take the position that allowing retroactive recov<c·ry in vY orthen and denying retroactive recove.ry in the
seYen cases now before the Court constitutes a denial
of equal protection of laws for the reason that there
is simply no substantive distinction between the cases
which should allow inequality of treatment. As heretofore pointed out, the distinction this Court has fastened
onto is that the winner of the race to the courtroom recovers and the losers don't. This is true regardless of
\\ hich accident happenPd first and regardless of which
case is filed first. In a sense, a deputy county clerk
really decides who "Wins when he jockeys the cases onto
the court calt>ndar.
this kind of distinction satisfy
the reqnirernent of equal protection of laws? We respectfully submit that the seven plaintiffs now before the
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Court art> entitled to a ddinitive answer.
VVe do not contend that a court eannot apply a new
decision prospectively. Courts have often done this under
different circumstances than exist in the cases at Bar
on the theor)' that the new distinction amonnts to new
law. This theory does not hold up lH'l'P for reasons discussed at Points II and III in this bri(:'f. But even if
this Court were to decidP on a pros1wctive application
of a new interpretabon of Section 35-1-fi2, it could not
give retroactive recovery to Worthen, allow that decision
to become final, and then refuse the same treatment to
the seven plaintiffs here without violating the equal protection of laws concept.
We take the position that an Appellate Court, if it is
to comply with the requirement of equal protection of
laws in applying a new decision
must come
within one or the other of three distinct categories.
First, it could adopte the rule that no case which
had be,en finally determined would come under the new
decision. This is the basis which the Supreme Court of
the United States has used in recent cases involving such
matters of exclusion of evidence, violation of the right
to counsel, etc. See for example Walters i:. City of St.
Louis, Mo., supra.

The cases at Bar do not come \\'ithin any such
possible distinction. They weren't ewn filed and most
certainly \Yere not finally determined at the time vVorthen
was given retroactive effect by this Court.
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Seco11d, it could adopt the rule that no case would
be given the bt>nefit of the new decision. rn1is could be
a reasonable breaking off point JH'O\'iding all litigants
werP treated alik<>. But here Worthen was given retroactive effect and the cases at Bar were filed afte·r
Worthen. Consequently, the Court here is laboring under
a total disability to make date of filing the determining
factor.
Third, it could adopt the rule that the new decision
would apply only to transactions which occurred subse(1nent to the ne\Y decision. But here again a Court cannot
the new decision to the circumstances of the
case hefore it and then refuse to apply the new decision
to other eases coming before it under substantially the
same circmustances without violating the equal protection of laws concept. In addition, the transactions in each
of the cases at Bar occurred after the transaction in
Vvorthen.
\Y orthen rt>covered his attorney's f eeis hut the Plaintiffs here haYe been denied rt>co\·e1-y although their causes
of action arose under substantially the same circumstanePs. The attempted division of \V ortlwn and the
seven cases at Bar into different categories is tenuous
and lacking in substance. This Court has made fish of
one and foul of another. Equal justice demands equal
treatment. vV e respectfully request this Honorable Court
to allow us a rehearing on this important constitutional

question.
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POINT V
THIS COURT, BY ALLOWING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN WORTHEN AND DENYING RETROACTIVE RECOVERY IN THE CASES AT BAR HAS DENIED PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO "UNIFORM OPERATION" OF
LAWS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

In Point IV of our brief we have called attention
to the fact that Plaintiffs have been deprived of their
right to equal protection of laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Utah State Supreme Court has made it clear that
interpretations of provisions of the United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court are highly
persuasive in connection with interpretations of similar
provisions of the Utah Constitution. See Unterrnyer v.
State Tax Commission (1942) 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d
881. The provisions of the Utah Constitution applicable
here are as follows:
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 2.
"All political power is inherent in the people;
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and benefit,
and thev have the right to alter or reform their
goverm{1ent as the public welfare
require."
(Italics ours)
The other provision of the Utah Constitution applicahlP here is Constitution of Ptah, Article I, Section 24.
"All laws of a general natme shall have uniform operation."
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The most frequently cited case setting forth the
test of whether an arm of State Government violate,s the
equal protection of laws requirement is Stale v. Mason,
(1938) 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, where the Court states:

"It is only where some persons or transac-

tions excluded from the operation of the law are
as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included in its operation
that the law is discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to differentiate those included from
those excluded from its operation can be found,
it must be held constitutional."
"* * * a classification is never unreasonable
or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features
so long as there is some basis for the diff erentiation between classes or subject matters included
as compared to those excluded from its operation,
provided the differentiation bears a reasonable
relation to the purposes to be accomplished by
the act.''
Other cases discussing the rule of law as it pertains
to equal protection o.f laws under the Utah Constitution
are as follows:
State v. Bayer (1908) 34 U. 257, 97 P. 129;
Salt Lake City'&. Utah Power and Light (1914) 45 U.
50, 142 P. 1067;
State v. Haltgreve (1921) 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894,
aff'd. 285 U.S. 105, 76 L.Ed. 643, 52 S.Ct. 273;
State v. Packer Corp. (1931) 77 U. 500, 297 P. 1013;
Blackman i:. City Court of S.L.C. (1934) 86 U. 541,
38 P.2d 725;
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Carter
P.2d 727;

t:.

State Tax Commission, (1939) 98 U. 96, 96

State v. J.B.&R.E. Walker, Inc. (1941) 100 U. 523,
116 P.2d 766;
Untermyer v. State Tax Commission (1942) 102 U.
214, 129 P.2d 881;
Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. t:. State Tax Commission
(1943) 103 U. 390, 135 P.2d 523;
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District
(1944) 106 U. 55, 145 P.2d 503;
Gronlirnd
l'.2d 464;

t:.

Salt Lake City (1948) 113 U. 284, 194

Wallberg v. Utah Pitblic Welfare Commission (1949)
115 u. 242, 203 p .2d 935 ;
Tygesen v. Jlagna Water Co. (1950) 119 U. 274, 226
P.2d 127;
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System
Board of Administrators (1952) 122 U. 44, 246 P.2d 591;
Abrahamsen 1.i. Board of Review of I11d1tstrial Commission ( 1955) 3 U .2d 289, 283 P .2d 213; and
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co. (19Gl) 12 U.2d 257,
366 p .2d 97 4.
As can be seen the basic test of whether a classification is unreasonable or arbitrary is
said classification "bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes
to be accomplished by the act."
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Turning to the case at Bar, tlit" legislative purpose
to be accomplished by Section 35-1-62 wa8 to equitably
distribute the burden of paying attorney8' fees and cost8
between the injured party and the compensation carrier
in third party ca8es. The intent was that said purpose
be carried out following the effective date of 1945. It
,,,.as the McConnell case that defeated that pnrpose.
The judicial purpose of the Utah Supreme Court in
deciding the reverse McConnell was to erase an incorrect decision and place in harmony once again the legisaltive and judicial meaning of the statute. We submit
that there is absolutely no reasonable relationship between the attempted classification of litigants by applying the "first man to the courtroom" test and the legislative and judicial purpose to be accomplished by the act.
There is no basic reason consistent with that purpose
for giving some compensation carriers a free ride and
not others. Justice demands an opposite result.

In Toronto ct ux. v. Sheffield et al. (1950) 118 U.
460, 222 P.2d 594, action was commenced by Toronto
against Sheffield to quiet title. The Trial Court entered
judgment for Plaintiff, thus sustaining Plaintiff's claim
that a certain four year Statute of Limitations barred
the defense set up by Defendant. Defendant appealed on
the basis that said four year Statute of Limitations enacted in 1939, which barred actions for recovery of real
estate which had been sold for delinquent taxes after
] 939 but did not bar such actions for sales made before
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1939, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Utah
sustained Defendant's contention and reversed, stating:
"Our state Constitution, Article 1, Section 24
provides that 'all laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation.' And Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution
forbids any state to 'deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws'

• • •

Here, there is no basis whatever for the distinction made. The conditions surrounding the
sale to the county under (statute) since the 1939
amendment and the objects and purposes thereof
are exactly the same as those of (earlier and similar statute) prior to that amendment. The only
factual difference whatever is a slight change in
t'hg procedure and the fact that the sale (made
under the former statute mitst have been made
before the one under the present statute a•rul
therefore deals with a claim which is more stale.
Certainly that fact would not justify tlie: distinction of barring the new claims while not barring
the older ones. We therefore conclude that this
differentiation between these two classes of sales
bears no reasonable relation to the purposes to be
accomplished by this act and therefore ho.ld that
the discrimination against pcrsou.s who as plaintiffs here purchased tax titles transferred to the
county under the statute in effect prior to the
1939 amendment is arbitrary and unreasonable
and therefore is unconstitidional."
The analogy between Toronto and the cases at Bar
rn obvious. In Toronto the legislature lifted the sales
made before 1939 out of the act, set them aside, and
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treated them differently. Why 1 Only because they were
"more stale" than the later cases. But this difference,
the Court said, "bears no reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by this act." The Court went
on to say that the act was discriminatory and therefore
unconstitutional.
Here we have a judicial decision that does the same
thing as did the legislative decision in Toronto. Here
the Court has applied a judicial interpretation to W orthen, thus accomplishing the legislative intent to have
the compensation carrier pay its share of attorney's fees
and costs, but has denied that same interpretation to
plaintiffs in the case at bar, thus defeating the selfsame
legislative intent. It is clear that because the "race to
the courtroom" classification "brars no reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished" either by the
legislature or by the judicial decision now under scrutiny,
said decision is "arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore is unconstitutional."
See also Sugarhouse Mercantile Co. v. Salt Lake
County et al. (1950) 119 Utah 234, 225 P.2d 1050, to the
same effect.
POINT VI
THE INST ANT DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF.

The decision in Worthen vs. Shurt.leff compels a
decision for plaintiffs in the instant case. This court,
on similar facts in Worthen vs. Shurtleff, 19 Utah 2d 80,
426 Pac. 2d 223, ruled against tht-> Utah State Depart-

rnent of Finance as administrator of the State Insurance
Fund and ruled that the State Insurance Fund should
pay its share of costs and attorney's fees.
In Worthen vs. Shitrtleff, the accident was December 2, 1964:, the Court order requiring payment by the
Insurance Fund May 25, 1966 and tlw Supreme Court
decision April 3, 1967. In the Walton, Simmons, Williams, Scott, Melo, McN eeley and Roedel cases, the accidents were variously from April 27, 1962 to February 20,
1964, th<:> payments under protest variously from October
27, 1964 to .January 1967, the suits filed for recovery
against the Insurance Fund from October 21, 1968 to
April 30, 1969 and the Supreme Court decision, the instant decision, January 29, 1970.
The only conceivable way for the Supreme Court
to hold as it did is to find that Worthen vs. Shurtleff
created a new cause of action, created at the time of the
<::·nactment of the statute, Section 35-1-62, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, but eliminated or suspend<:>d in 1962 by
illcCom1cll i:s. Commissioner of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395,
375 Pac. 2d 394. But the inconsistency in that position
is that Worthen vs. Shurtleff found, on its own facts,
a cause of action to have existed since either the District
Court Order requiring contribution March 25, 1966 or
from the date services were rendered, the benefit of
which the Fund enjoyed, sometime between tht> date of
accident December 2, 1964 and date of said Order March
25, 1966.
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Had the instant cases been filed and argued simultaneously with Worthen vs. Shiirtleff, would their facts
not have compelled the same result1 Obviously, yes. The
instant cases are similar in all crucial respects to Worthen
vs. Shurtleff and on the same principles must be decided
the same way.
Indeed, had the Worthen vs. Shurt.lt:ff case and these
cases come on before this Court the same day, as they
might wen have done, the payments in all five cases
under protest to the Fund having been made in the 30rnonth period prior to the April 3, 1967 W ortlwn vs.
Shurtleff decision, and had the Worthen vs. Shurtleff
case been setlled on the Courthouse steps or before decision, the same arguments which sustained the Worthen
'rs. Shurtleff decision would have compelled a similar
decision here.
But, let us examine the cases for essential differences. For that purpose, crucial dates are set forth as
follows:
(See chart on Page 23)
It is essential to ask when did the cause of action
arise1 Worthen vs. Shurtleff, itself, of necessity, recognizes a cause of action to have arisen at an earlier date
than its April 3, 1967 decision date. If then, the cause of
action arose by the Insurance Fund's refusal to pay and
if a four year statute of limitation is applicable, as the
lower court ruled, then these cases almost have to be
decided the same way as the Worthen vs. Shurtleff case.

21
The lower court's ruling as to the fonr year statute of
limitations reads as follows:
''l am also of the opinion that the four vear
statute of limitations of Sec. 78-12-25 UCA i953
applies since I consider that tlw action is based
upon a contract for services rendered rather than
an action for a liability created by statute Sec.
78-12-26 (three year statute) or against an officer
who is a tax collector, Sec. 78-12-31 (six month
statute.)"
If a three year statute of limitation should be applied, Williams, Scott, Melo, McN eeley and Roedel would
fail, however Walton and Simmons still coud not possibly
fail under the same reasoning of the W orthcn i's. Shurtleff case.

Further examination of the case will reveal that the
only essential differences between the instant cases and
lVorthen vs. Slmrtleff is that in the Worthen vs. Shurtleff case the plaintiff refused payment altogether and in
the instant cases, the Insurance Fund ·was paid under
protest.
Plaintiffs should not have to dPpend upon their prot<=>st to prt>serve their rights to recover hack the payment
as money had and received by the Insurance Fund and
to which it was not entitled or, for money owed for
compensation for services rendered. However, it is well
established that when payment is made under protest,
the protest preserves the rights of the protester.
A protest is unnecessary where it would be useless,
Illinois Glass Company vs. Chicago Telegraph Company,
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85 NE 200. It i::-; evidPncP of eornpubion and unwillingness to
and notict> to the person to \rhorn tlH• payment is iua<ll' that tlw person payillg <lops not aeq11it>se1•
in thP ilh·gal dPman<l and t1H·reli.r sttrr1•1Hlt·r up any
right he may han• to recov<'r haek tl11·
. •1/ c.11 illr111
u.;. Richards. Calif. 70 Arn. D<'c. 1)55.
Espe{·ia1Iy :-;hould this lw so wher1· tlH· }H'rson making payment is at a disadanvtage in ass<'rtion of his lPgal
rights at the ti11w of payuwnt, and in suelt instaneP t]H·
party ought to lw allO\n>d, as noted in -±0 A.111. .Jur., "Payments," Art. 185, pp. 842, to "assPrt his supposed right
on reasonably equal tem1s," by making paynwnt and
bringing suit later.

Nam(' of Case

Date of
Accident

Date of Payment Date Suit Filed
Under Protest
Order

Date of Supreme
Court Decision

Oct. 24, 1962

McConnell vs. Commissioner
of Finance

Apr. 3, 1967

Worthen vs. Shurtleff

Dec. 2, 1964

Paid into court
Mar. 18, 1966

Mar. 25, 1966

Walton vs. Utah State
Department of Finance

Apr. 27, 1962

Dec. 24, 1966

Jan. 20, 1969

Jan. 29, 1969

Simmons vs. Utah State
Department of Finance

Apr. 27, 1962

January 1967

Jan. 20, 1969

Jan. 29, 1969

Williams vs. Utah State
Department of Finance

Jan. 15, 1963

Oct. 27, 1964

Oct. 21, 1968

Jan. 29, 1969

Scott vs. Utah State
Department of Finance

Mar. 6, 1962

Jan. 4, 1965

Nov. 15, 1968

Jan. 29, 1969

Melo, McNeely, and Roedel
vs. Utah State Department
of Finance

Feb. 20, 1964

Jan. 5, 1966

Apr. 30, 1969

Jan. 29, 1969

24
In Buford v:;. Lonergan, 6 Utah 301, 22 Pac. 164,
Affirmed, 148 U. S. 581, 37 L. Ed 569, the Utah court
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States,
held that party making payment less than voluntary and
under protest was able to recover back the excess money
paid even through all parties were in possession of all
the facts.
In that case, before the day of delivery of cattle
purchased, plaintiffs paid a large part of the price but
the defendant refused to deliver the cattle until the full
balance of the alleged price was paid, whereupon plaintiffs paid it under protest, claiming theright to deduct
the price of cattle allegedly not delivered. The court
said, page 308 :
"Plaintiffs were compelled to either pay this
demand or seek redress by tedious and expensive
litigation, the property hostile to plaintiff's interPst and liable to deterioration and loss. Payment
under such cfrcumstances was not a voluntary
payment, and, being made under duress, may be
recovered back; and the fact that it was made
with knowledge of all the facts makes no differ-

ence."

POINT VII
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF, 19 UTAH 2d 80 SHOULD
BE APPLIED CONSITENT WITH ITS OWN FACTS.

The Court, in the instant case, said:
" . . . Since the construction of a statute in the
light of existing judicial interpretation ( the McConnell case) is the precise issue herP, we think
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and hold that, espousing such fiction here simply
would amount to judicial legislation ... "
We submit that this court has, in this instance, done
'vhat it se,eks to generally avoid, i.e., judicially legislate,
in that, as pointed out earlier, it changes the effective
date of a statute and it applies on-again, off-again the
obligation of the Insurance Fund to pa:': its own expenses
as if the statute itself had changed.
There are those cases where an overruling decision
should be given only prospective effect but we submit
that this is not such a case involving, as it does, only
simple issues of debtor and creditor. As stated in numerous cases, in 10 ALR 3rd 1371, the general rule is that
a judicial overruling of a precedent has both prospective
and retroactive effect unless the overruling decision declares that it shall have only prospective effect. We
agree the judicial overruling of a precedent should not
be given retroactive effect where to do so would unfairly
interfere with vested rights, contractual rights, domestic
rights, boundary lines, public buildings already constructed, changes of position made in reliance upon the
legislative interpretation: bonded indebtedness incurred
based directly upon an interpretation, or other cases
wheer the positions of parties have changed in reliance
upon the interpretation. It is respectfully submitted that
any such exceptions to the accepted general rule of retroactivity has no application in these cases because the
plaintiffs and defendant never entered into any contracts
of any kind except by implication and because the rights
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and obligations between them arise out of a contribution
principle as enunciated by the terms of the Utah statute,
and where no one has been, or could be inconvenienced
by reliance upon the interpretation overruled.
CONCLUSION
We are aware of the fact that petitions for rehearing
are not often granted. This is because ordinarily counsel for the respective parties have been heard, and the
issues have been fully met by the Court.
The cases at Bar present a different situation. .As
a result of clerical error counsel for five of the Plaintiffs has not been heard. Of greater importance is the
fact that this Honorable Court's opinion gives rise to
serious questions involving whether justice has been
done, and whether the opinion itself is Constitutional.
Most of these questions have never been presented because they are the offspring of the opinion itself.
First, this Court's adoption of the "first man to the
courtroom" test of retroactivity has defeated the legislative intent to require compensation carriers to bear
their share of attorney's fees and costs in third party
cases. There is absolutely no legal necessity for this
Court to judicially cause such an unjust result in the
very face of a contrary legislative intent.
Second, this Court's adoption of the "first man to
the courtroom" test amounts to judicial legislation inasmuch as its effect is to lift a piece of time between 1962
and 1967 out of the effective period of Section 35-1-62
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and to give compensation caniers frpe ridPs during that
time, contrary to the legislative intent. It is our position
that this Honorable Court should not tamper with the
effective date of a statute.
Third, this Honorable Court, hy allowing retroactive
recovery in \Vorthen and denying it ht>rP as denied Plaintiff their right to eqnal protPction of laws contrary to
the United States Constitution. The division of \Vorthen
and the cases at Bar into separate cla::ssifications on the
basis of the "first man" to the courtroom" test is wholly
arbitrary and discriminatory.
Fourth, plaintiffs have likewise bet•n denied "equal
protection and benefit" and "uniform operation" of laws
eontrary to the Utah Constitution by adoption of the
''first man to the courtroom" test.
In conclusion we respectfully submit that Plaintiffs
should be granted a rehearing in the interest of basic
justice.
Respectfully snbm itted,
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